The Role of Ataturk and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in the Treaties of Moscow and Kars

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Abstract
In the article we study the historical circumstances of conclusion and the significance of the Treaty of Moscow\(^1\) and Treaty of Kars\(^2\) in 1921 for both Turkey and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and participation Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha – Ataturk and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT)\(^3\) in preparing and signing of these documents.

A study of these documents shows that during the preparation and conduct of negotiations between the representatives of the Soviet\(^4\) and Turkish\(^5\) sides, the young Soviet state decided to support the unrecognized the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), created by Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha – Ataturk.

The Moscow Treaty was the first official recognition of the independence and equality by the Soviet Russia towards the new Turkey, which was fighting against the Entente states and the Anglo-Greek intervention. The objective role of Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in preparing and signing of the Treaty of Moscow and the Treaty of Kars is given only in the context of that time: the geopolitical aspirations of all stakeholders and the real historical events.

Key words: Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha – Ataturk, The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, The Treaty of Moscow, The Treaty of Kars, The Republic of Turkey.

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\(^1\) The Treaty of Moscow or Treaty of Brotherhood (Turkish: Moskova Antlaşması) was a peace treaty between the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), and the Russian SFSR, signed on 16 March 1921.

\(^2\) The Treaty of Kars was a peace treaty that established the common borders between Turkey and the three Transcaucasian republics of the Soviet Union Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. The treaty was signed in the city of Kars on 13 October 1921.

\(^3\) The Republic of Turkey was declared on October 23, 1923. The first president-Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

\(^4\) The Russian SFSR representatives were Georgy Chicherin and Jelaleddin Korkmazov.

\(^5\) The representatives of Grand National Assembly of Turkey were Yusuf Kemal bey, Riza Nur bey, Ali Fuad Pasha.
1. Introduction

Many Russian historians note the unusual and paradoxical nature of the union of the Turkish and Russian peoples. Eternal enemies have committed the impossible; they signed an agreement that for many years will retain a certain stability in the international relations of the two states.

In our opinion, Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Vladimir I. Lenin, as leaders of two new, unrecognized states, made a step towards each other, proceeding from the geopolitical circumstances of that period.

But from a legal point of view, these agreements were not valid, since the Sultan and the Sultan's government, headed by Damad Ferid were the official authorities. The Civil War was gaining strength in Russia.

But from the point of view of the new Turkey and Soviet Russia, these treaties had enormous moral significance for both sides.

R. Kazanjian in the article “Bolsheviks and Young Turks. History of love and new documents” states that Soviet diplomacy supported both the Kemalists and their opponents - 'the leaders of the Young Turks Jemal, Enver, Halil (Kazanjian, 2011).

G. Chicherin even noted that in the interests of Bolshevik Russia “it is useful to be in contact with the parallel Turkish center by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, in addition to the Kemalists,” and “it is very important to support the people who do not belong to the dominant group of Kemalists, in order to be able to exert more pressure on the latter” (Kazanjian, 2011) in his letters to the Central Committee of the RCP (Bolsheviks) in April, 1921.

The facts and documents of that time indicate that Kemalist Turkey and Bolshevik Russia had many contradictions in their emerging relations, but both sides understood that these contradictions should be smoothed out to create the basis for friendly and fraternal relations.

Chicherin noted: “Our then rapprochement with the national Turkey was mutual act of self-preservation” and “if we did not support the national movement in Turkey, England would be at the gates of the Caucasus”. Because of this, “their (Kemalists) death back in 1920, could lead to an extremely strong development of the most reactionary pan-Islamism and fanaticism, with sharpening against us (Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, Tom II, Moskva 1958a, 554-555)” at the Fourteenth Congress of the RCP.

On March 1, 1920 Chicherin in his letter to Lenin noted that “we should treat Pan-Islamism as a hostile force with which temporary transactions are possible, like with some Estonian or the Polish bourgeoisie, and no more, and therefore we cannot count on a long-term alliance with power, essentially hostile to us” (Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, Tom II, Moskva 1958a, 554-555). Young Soviet diplomacy clearly understood that it was necessary to weigh everything before making concrete decisions regarding Kemalist Turkey in order to build the right international relations with future associates in the world revolution. I. Niftaliev writes that the Sultan's government in Istanbul lost control of the situation after the signing of the Armistice of Mudros, and the national liberation movement against the intervention of Western European countries was organized by Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his supporters in Angora (Niftaliev-a).
The domination of Britain in the Anatolian-Caucasian region was a common danger that made close two rivals as Turkey and Russia. Niftaliev noted that “if before the Armistice of Mudros the Caucasus remained a zone of conflicts between Russia and Turkey, but now this region has gradually become a link for both sides. Turkey again begins to play a leading role in the geopolitical processes of the South Caucasus, determining the new political configuration of the region for the first time since 1918. To a decisive degree, it was due to the strategic alliance between the government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the Bolshevik government of Soviet Russia” (Niftaliev-a).

Therefore, Mustafa Kemal and his supporters decided to seek help from the Soviet government. The first step was taken by the Turkish side. June 3, 1920 Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR sent a letter to Chairman Mustafa Kemal of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

The letter notes that the Soviet Government was pleased to get acquainted with the 8 principles of foreign policy of the new Turkish Government, headed by the Great National Assembly in Angora. The principles comprised the following: 1) Proclamation of Turkey's independence; 2) Incorporation of Turkish territories into the Turkish state; 3) Provision of Turkish Armenia, Kurdistan, Lazhistan, Batumi region, Eastern Thrace and all territories with a mixed Turkish-Arab population of the right to determine their own destiny; 4) Transfer of questions about the straits of the conference of coastal black and states to their prerogative; 5) Abolition of the regime of surrender and economic control by foreign states. 6) Elimination of all kinds of spheres of foreign influence. The Soviet Government suggests the immediate establishment of diplomatic and consular relations in order to establish friendly relations and a lasting friendship between Turkey and Russia (Dokumenty vneshei politiki SSSR, Tom II, 1958: 554-555).

The first Turkish delegation went to Moscow to start negotiations. The first contacts between the RSFSR and Turkey took place on July 19, 1920, when a Turkish government delegation headed by Foreign Minister Bekir Sami arrived in Moscow. The diplomatic note of Bekir Sami in July 31, 1920 notes the following: “Today is exactly one week since our last meeting with Comrade Karakhan was held. Our second meeting was to be held last Monday. However, we are hopelessly waiting for the promised invitation for a week. The critical situation of our country, surrounded by the Entente forces, should clearly convince you about the importance of this meeting for us in order to immediately conclude our talks. The Turkish Mission asks you, Mr. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to establish the people and the time of our regular negotiations, taking account the seriousness of our internal situation. The negotiations should happen in the very near future” (Dokumenty vneshei politiki SSSR, Tom II, 1958: 555).

Lenin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Chicherin and his deputy Karakhan welcomed Representatives of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on August 14, 1920.

On November 29, 1920, Soviet power was established in Armenia. The political situation in the Caucasus was changing rapidly. Soviet leaders knew that there was confrontation between Turks and Armenians. Therefore, in a telegram to the Special Representative of the RSFSR in Turkey, Comrade Budu Mdivani wrote that sovietisation of Armenia makes a significant change in the situation.
Tell the Turks that it is preferable, it is in their own interests, to support the Soviet authorities in Armenia by observing a moderate and friendly line towards it. If the Turks fulfill the above conditions, our command in the Caucasus will continue to issue weapons, and they will gradually receive gold from the number of one and a half million Ruble taken by Bekir Sami and the detainees on the road by the Soviet side.

At the same time, the Russian government sent an invitation to Turkey to a conference to resolve territorial issues, while noting that similar invitations were sent also to the Armenian SSR and Azerbaijan SSR.

Mustafa Kemal wrote to Chicherin on November 29, 1920: “I am deeply convinced that on the day when the working people of the West, on the one hand, and the enslaved peoples of Asia and Africa, on the other, will understand that at present international capital is used by them for mutual annihilation and enslavement for the sake of the maximum profit of their masters. On the day when the consciousness of the crime of colonial policy penetrates the hearts of the working masses of the world - the power of the bourgeoisie will end. My sincere respect to you” (Dokumenty vnéshnei politiki SSSR, Tom III, 1958: 11-12).

As we see, the representatives of the Turkish side tried to get closer to Soviet Russia. At the same time, the Soviet authorities understood that if the issue of Armenian territories was on the agenda, then the RSFSR could lose all the Transcaucasia.

On February 19, 1921, the Azerbaijani leader N. Narimanov wrote to Lenin: “I must warn you: Comrade Chicherin is confusing the eastern issue, he is too interested in the Armenian question. He does not consider we may have disruption with the Ankara (Angora) government because of the Armenian issue. I declare that we must make a strong alliance with the Angorans at all costs if we want to keep Azerbaijan” (Tarasov).

2. Moscow Treaty

On February 18, 1921, the second Turkish delegation arrived in Moscow (there were the delegations of the Armenian SSR and Azerbaijan SSR).

Negotiations were difficult for both the Turkish side and the Russian Federation. It became known that in February 1921, the Soviet government was temporarily lost in the part of Armenia, S. Vratsyan, the chairman of the of the Committee for the Salvation of the Motherland that took power into the hands, officially announced that the delegation of the Armenian SSR was being deprived of the right to negotiate with the Turks on behalf of Armenia. In this regard, the Turkish delegation stated that it would not sit at the negotiating table with the delegation of the Armenian SSR.

Therefore, the Soviet side had to agree with the conditions of the Turkish side. Before the official opening of the conference, Armenian Karakhan, the deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, was replaced to Jalaleddin Korkmazov from Dagestan, the member of the All-Union Central Executive Committee.

The government of the RSFSR, on the one hand, wanted to achieve the abolition of the enslaving Alexandropol Treaty for Armenia. On the other it wanted to sign an agreement with Turkey. By this, the Soviet republics could be protected from further encroachments by Turkey and Western European states on its territory.
After the victory of the Turkish army over the Greek interventionists, on January 10, 1921, at Ineniu, diplomatic pressure of Western powers intensified on Turkey. The Entente wanted to disrupt the Moscow talks and involve the Angora government in the anti-Soviet front.

In a conversation on January 23, 1921, the representative of the Italian mission in Angora, Bodrero, asked Ali Fuad (Cebesoy), the Turkish Ambassador to the RSFSR: “How do the Turks see a decision on the relationship with Soviet Armenia? General Ali Fuad replied: This decision depends on whether we reach an agreement with the Entente or it will force us to seek an agreement with Moscow”. There was another question: what will happen if an agreement with the Entente is not reached, Ali Fuad replied: “We will sign an agreement with Russia. We will cede to it part of Armenia (meaning part of the territories seized by the Turks -R.K.) in return for compensation-Adzharia, Akhalsikha and Kars region” (Zaharov).

In February 1921, a conference of the Entente powers was convened in London to discuss two issues: 1) the situation in the Middle East and 2) the German reparations.

The Turkish delegation of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey headed by Bekir Sami was also invited to London to participate in the discussion of the Middle East issues.

That is, in London, the Turkish delegation acted in a unified composition -the formally legitimate government of Istanbul and the government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in Angora (Ankara), which received only de facto status (Tarasov).

Bekir Sami expressed his right-wing views in the Kemalist government. Therefore, he conspired with the Entente countries. In London, a separate peace was concluded with France and Italy. It gave economic advantages to the European powers in Anatolia. An anti-Russian (anti-Soviet) military-political unit was created. It meant the inclusion of Turkey in the camp of opponents of Soviet Russia.

The terms of the London agreements with France and Italy were rejected by Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Grand National Assembly of Turkey. The government in Angora (Ankara) continued the foreign policy towards rapprochement with Russia, which was defined by Mustafa Kemal. The attempt of the European powers to prevent the creation of a union of two unrecognized states ended in failure.

The Soviet-Turkish conference started on February 26, 1921. The People's Commissar Chicherin said that Soviet Russia renounces the colonialist policy of tsarism: “Now, being here... I solemnly declare that we have forever abandoned, reject and condemn these age-old claims. The friendship of the peoples of Russia and Turkey is an essential condition for Soviet Russia in its international life. Soviet Russia is an ally of all peoples fighting for their freedom” (Heifets,1968: 109).

The head of the Turkish delegation, Yusuf Kemal-bey stated that the Turkish people, fighting against the Treaty of Sevres, see themselves as “an example of another people pursuing an even higher ideal; between them an agreement for the purpose of a general action arises naturally. Under these circumstances, historical determinism would force our two peoples to come to an agreement even if this were contrary to the desires of the rulers. Geographical, historical, economic and political conditions showed us the way to Russia” (Kuznetsova, 1961: 46).
Chicherin in the letter of P.G. Mdivani on March 1, 1921, wrote that the Turkish delegation “began with the inviolability of the National Pact and the Treaty of Alexandropol that the return of Armenia to any parts of the ’Turkish eastern provinces’, by which it meant the occupied territory passed to Turkey under the Treaty of Alexandropol ‘in no case can neither be considered nor accepted by the Angora national government’ and that all claims and claims beyond the defined and established boundaries specified in this treaty can only serve to renew the previous strife” (Rozenfeld).

Any disagreement with the Turkish delegation and rejection of their proposals at the talks in Moscow threatened, according to Chicherin's letter to N.N. Krestinsky, Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP, on March 1, “extremely harmful consequences - the rupture of the Russian-Turkish conference and the immediate departure of the Turks took place because of Russia’s rejection of the National Pact and the Treaty of Alexandropol Relations to Turkey reached an extremely serious critical moment created a serious crisis” (Zaharov).

The situation was further aggravated by the concurrent conduct of the Turks at the same time as the Bolsheviks in Moscow and the Entente in London, where the Turks, by the way, sought recognition of the Treaty of Alexandropol by the West. Chicherin wrote to N.N. Krestinsky in those days the following: “despite the any outcome of the present conference, we undoubtedly have to go through an extremely difficult period in our relations with Turkey” (Kazanjian, 2011). Therefore, the immediate signing of the treaty with Turkey was vital in those conditions. Chicherin informed the Central Committee of the RCP on March 9, 1921, “in view of the ongoing negotiations in London even before the resumption of the work of the conference on March 10 - we should end soon with the Turks by accepting their last issue on the borders” (Kazanjian-b).

On March 10, 1921, the Russian side accepted the “indispensable conditions of the Turks; according to which the border runs along the ‘Arpachay and the Araks’ (most of the territory seized by the Turks during the Turkish-Armenian war of 1920 and held by them at the time of the talks, thus, to Turkey); Nakhichevan should be an ‘autonomous region under the protectorate of Azerbaijan’, provided ‘that Azerbaijan does not transfer this protectorate to another side (according to the plan of the RSFSR, the region should ‘directly depend on Russia’); Turkish troops were to be no more than ‘at 8 verst6 distance from the border’ (according to the proposal of Russia it is no closer than 20 verst); in the preamble of the treaty, the words ‘about friendship’ should be added to brotherhood” (Zaharov).

Chicherin informed B. Legrand that “after almost two weeks of fierce debate when we agreed on the main, that is, mainly about the border, we could open a political commission”, i.e. continue the conference. Chicherin wrote the same thing to Lenin on March 10: “In such cases as the conclusion of a treaty with the Turks, every word, every comma is the result of a long struggle” (Zaharov).

Turkish ambassador General Ali Fuad to Moscow wrote that “at a time when Russia established a new regime, they thought a lot about the termination of the Turkish-Russian enmity sown by the kings, and the strengthening of fraternity and friendship between our peoples” (Shamsutdinov, 1966: 175). Therefore, the Turkish government did its utmost to establish contacts with Soviet Russia, but on favorable terms. It should be noted that the

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6 The verst is an ancient Russian unit of length. 1 verst is equal to 1066.8 meters.

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government of Angora included people who had considerable experience in government, the economy of the Ottoman Empire and in military strategy. Most of the Soviet commissars actually had no such experience.

The main principles of the foreign policy of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey were: 1) Proclamation of Turkey's independence; 2) Incorporation of Turkish territories into the Turkish state; 3) Provision of Turkish Armenia, Kurdistan, Lazistan, Batumi region, Eastern Thrace and all territories with a mixed Turkish-Arab population of the right to determine their own destiny; 4) Transfer of questions about the straits of the conference of coastal black and sea states to their prerogative; 5) Abolition of the regime of surrender and economic control by foreign states; 6) Elimination of all kinds of spheres of foreign influence (Dokumenty vnesheie politiki SSSR, Tom II, 1958b, 554-555).

Therefore, the Turkish delegation followed these principles, and especially the principle of ‘incorporation of Turkish territories into the Turkish state’.

According to Chicherin, after the resumption of the Conference even on the border of Moscow Turks hardly agreed Turkey's ambassador to Moscow, General Ali Fuad as a member of the Turkish delegation stated that “due to some moments of crisis and as a result of our pressure and our disagreement with their proposal, the representative of the RSFSR Commissariat of foreign Affairs failed to effectively carry out its own line. at the talks in Moscow” (Zaharov).

The Turkish side worked out a strategy for negotiations, which it adhered to throughout the conference. They managed to convince the Soviet delegation to sign a peace treaty. There was an acute diplomatic game, the winners of which were the Turkish side.

We state that that in early March 1921, during the Russian-Turkish negotiations in Moscow, in the highest circles of Russia talked about a possible to attack both Kars and Erzurum of the Red Army. It was true that the conclusion of agreements took place at unfavorable conditions for Russia. The Turkish side had intentions to give up strategically important territories on the border with the former Russian Empire.

Soviet Russia, after seven years of uninterrupted wars, and also flaring up on the outskirts of the emerging state of the civil war, did not have the human and material resources for new military operations at the Transcaucasian front. Another problem was Dashnak Armenia. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of USSR in his report for 1919-1920 notes that at that time, the main obstacle to achieving full agreement was the issue of establishing Turkey's borders in the East.

Negotiating, with the Turkish delegation and, on the other hand, with the delegation of the Dashnak Armenia government, the Soviet government was put by the force to find ways to reconcile the territorial claims of both governments. This task was essentially impracticable (Dokumenty vnesheie politiki SSSR, Tom II, Moskva, 1958c). The Entente countries wanted to prevent the Soviet-Turkish rapprochement.

Therefore, they provoked territorial disputes between Turkey and Armenia. Dashnak Armenia launched military provocations against the Turks. The European powers wanted the Armenian-Turkish conflict to grow into a Kemalist Turkey's war with Soviet Russia. They planned to create a new anti-Russian front in the Caucasus that would help Russian general
Wrangel to launch an offensive against Moscow, where the power was seized by the Bolsheviks led by Lenin.

Despite difficult negotiations, on March 16, 1921, the Treaty of Friendship and Brotherhood was signed between the government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey from Angora (Ankara) and the Council of People's Commissars of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. The world history recorded it as the Moscow Treaty of 1921.

It consisted of a preamble, 16 articles and 3 annexes. The main factors determining the possibility of signing this treaty were: 1) The common interests of the Russian and Turkish peoples in the struggle for freedom and independence, 2) the urgent need for close inter-state rapprochement for both Turkey and Russia, 3) the need to exit from international isolation, 4) extremely difficult financial, economic and state situations of both states, 5) sincere desire to build a new world of domination of workers and peasants.

Armenian historians argue that despite the diplomatic efforts of Soviet Armenia aimed at a just solution of the issue, according to the Moscow Russian-Turkish treaty of March 16, 1921, the Turkish territories of Kars and Ardagan were illegally ceded by the Bolsheviks to Turkey, the Surmalinsky county (with a sacred for Armenians Mount Ararat). The issue was resolved without the representatives of Armenia, and the parties did not have any legal authority (Arzumanian).

Nakhichevan uyezd⁷ was transferred to the protectorate of Soviet Azerbaijan on the rights of an autonomous territory (on the same rights, Nagorno-Karabakh was illegally transferred to Azerbaijan in early July 1921 by Bolsheviks). Subsequently, under strict pressure from Soviet Russia, a delegation of Soviet Armenia was forced to sign under the Kars Soviet-Turkish treaty of October 13, 1921, which directly resulted from the unlawful Moscow Treaty (Zaharov).

Azeri historians at the same time argue that in the “initial plans of Soviet Russia and the Armenian SSR was the separation from the Azerbaijani SSR also Nakhchivan and Zangezur, in order to completely burn the bridges connecting Azerbaijan and Turkey. However, the firm position of Gazi Mustafa Kemal government, Azerbaijani Communists led by N. Narimanov and B. Shakhtakhtinsky, as well as resistance of the population of Nakhchivan prevented this plan. The decisions of the Moscow and Kars conferences of 1921 consolidated the autonomous status of Nakhchivan within the Azerbaijan SSR” (Niftaliev-b). As we see, the same problem is argued differently by different parties.

3. Kars Treaty

On September 26, 1921, representatives of the Armenian, Azerbaijani and Georgian Soviet Socialist Republics and Turkey participated in the Kars conference. The representatives of the RSFSR also attended the conference. On October 13, 1921, a four-party “Treaty of Friendship between the Armenian SSR, the Azerbaijani SSR, the Georgian SSR, and Turkey” was concluded with the participation of the RSFSR in Kars or the Kars Treaty was signed (Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, Tom IV, 1960, 420-429).

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⁷ An uyezd was an administrative subdivision of the Russian Empire and the early RSFSR till 1929.
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The text of this document is a slightly edited version of the Moscow Treaty of March 16, 1921 (Dokumenty vnesheii politiki SSSR, Tom III, 1959, 597-604). The treaty was ratified by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on July 20, 1921, the Turkish Grand National Assembly ratified it on July 31, 1921. The exchange of ratified document was held on September 22, 1921 in Kars. The necessity of preparing and signing the Kars Treaty can be explained as follows. The Moscow treaty with Turkey was signed on behalf of Russia, which formally had no relation to the countries of Transcaucasia, but it contained articles that directly concerned them. Therefore, the preparation and signing of the five-sided Kars Treaty is quite logical.

In 1921, the “Sovietization” of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan was formally ended. But “Sovietization” was still unsustainable so that the RSFSR could entrust these republics to sign international treaties independently.

The second article of the Moscow Treaty gives the Kars and Surmalin provinces of Armenia with Mount Ararat to Turkey, and the third articles distributes Nakhichevan under the protectorate of Azerbaijan.

The Treaty of Kars consists of a preamble, 20 articles and 3 annexes. The term of the contract was not stipulated, which for some reason is not considered. Article 9 runs:

“In order to ensure the opening of the straits and the freedom of passage through them of merchant ships of all nations, Turkey and Georgia agree to transfer the final production the international statute of the Black Sea and the straits at the future conference from the delegates of coastal states, provided that its decisions are without prejudice the full sovereignty of Turkey, as well as the security of Turkey and its capital, Constantinople” (Dokumenty vnesheii politiki SSSR, Tom IV, Moskva 1960, 424).

This is a very important point of the Treaty of Kars: the Straits of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles have always been an important strategic weapon of Turkish foreign policy. For Russia and the Caucasian Republics, the establishment of a favorable regime for the passage of straits for their own ships was and remains a very important condition for the functioning of the state economy.

A year after the signing, the Kars Treaty was ratified by all three Transcaucasian republics. The documents on ratification in Yerevan (Irivan) were handed over to the Turkish side. The Treaty of Kars has legalized the Armenian-Turkish border that has been in effect up to now. “Based on this agreement, the Armenian-Turkish memorandum on the use of drinking and irrigation water on the Armenian-Turkish border was signed. This is the only document that regulates relations between Turkey and Armenia (Zaharov)”.

The Treaty of Kars continued the line of the Soviet-Turkish alliance. He abolished all previously concluded treaties on territorial delimitation in Transcaucasia. The north-eastern border of Turkey was established that the Kars and Igdir regions, occupied by the Turkish side during the Armenian-Turkish war of 1920, withdrew to Turkey. These were the districts of Kars, Ardahan and Artvin. Batumi (Batum) departs to Georgia. The former Nakhichevan region, populated by Armenians, withdrew to Azerbaijan. Thus, the borders of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan were established.

After 1921, the first official bilateral document is the Political Document on Principles of Good-Neighborly and Friendly Cooperation between the USSR and Turkey, signed on August
22, 1978 by Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit in Moscow. The agreement states that the parties do not have mutual territorial claims. The agreement was signed by Alexei Kosygin from the Soviet side.

Article 2 indicated the absence of mutual territorial claims on the part of the USSR. Positive responses of the Turkish press of that time showed that this agreement is a direct continuation of the Moscow and Kars contracts of 1921. The agreement reached during B. Ecevit's visit was supposed to contribute to the expansion of economic and technical cooperation, trade, cultural exchange and cooperation in other areas.

During this visit, the Soviet-Turkish Agreement on the delimitation of the continental shelf between the two countries in the Black Sea was also signed (Kireev, 2007: 337).

On March 12, 1991, another “Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Turkey” was signed. M. Gorbachev signed the Treaty for the USSR in the rank of president. The Treaty was signed by President Turgut Ozal of Turkey.

Article 2 states “the Parties undertake to maintain their common borders as borders of peace, friendship and good-neighborliness, not to use force or threat in force in mutual relations, not to allow their territory to be used for committing aggression, subversive or separatist actions against each other” (Kireev, 2007: 338). A specific feature of this agreement is the mention of the term of its operation: This Agreement is concluded for a period of twenty years and will be automatically renewed each time for the next five-year periods unless either party notifies the other party in writing one year before the expiration of the relevant period of its desire to stop it. After the collapse of the USSR, some mass media of Russia, Georgia, Armenia began to raise the issue of the denunciation of the Moscow and Kars agreements of 1921.

We believe that common sense and international agreements will not raise the issue of denouncing these treaties on the agenda unilaterally or in international organizations. I completely agree with V.A. Zakharov, who writes that when “Armenia proclaimed its independence in 1991, it was stated that an independent republic is the successor of Soviet Armenia. This meant that the third republic recognizes all treaties concluded by the Armenian SSR. In addition, becoming a member of the UN in March 1992, the Armenian authorities actually recognized the territorial integrity of all member countries of this organization. So, Armenia recognized already several times the territorial integrity of Turkey de jure (Zaharov)”. The significance of the Moscow and Kars agreements is great for Turkey, since these agreements recognize the integrity of modern Turkey and its external borders.

4. Conclusion

1. Both Turkish and Soviet leaders tried to use contradictions in order to obtain the most beneficial version of the relationship for themselves. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey worked out a strategic plan for negotiating, which was maintained throughout the conference, and it managed to persuade the Soviet delegation to sign the treaty. All historical events connected with the signing of the Moscow and Kars agreements should be viewed from the objective and subjective reasons that led to the signing of these important for the two new states treaties.
2. Such objective reasons are: a) the desire of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and Bolsheviks to withdraw from international isolation; b) to strengthen political positions within the country (both the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and Bolsheviks); c) to change their international position by recognizing their state and political legitimacy both in Turkey and in Russia; d) avoid annexation and indemnities from the countries of the Entente and its allies, which would lead to the economic and political enslavement of these new states; e) the question of Western Armenia was not so important for Soviet Russia. Socialist idealism about the world revolution and the creation of friendly states around the world did not envisage, in the near future, international military conflicts and interethnic strife (disputes) according to the majority of Soviet revolutionaries; f) the Bolsheviks sought to spread communist ideology in the East. They believed that Soviet Russia would not be able to spread its political influence in the Islamic world without Turkey and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

3. The subjective reasons for the need for close rapprochement for Turkey with Soviet Russia were: a) The political intuition of Gazi Mustafa Kemal and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey had a great influence on the preparation and signing of the Moscow and Kars agreements; b) the understanding of the common interests of the Russian and Turkish peoples in the struggle for freedom and independence; c) the desire of the Soviet leadership to help the people of Turkey to get out of the military, political, economic, social crisis; d) distrust of the Entente countries; their policies were aimed at pitting and fomenting mutual hatred among various ethnic groups within Turkey, the Transcaucasus, and also in Russia.

4. These treaties gave strength to the leaders of the new states; it influenced a large number of citizens-supporters who still hesitated about choosing their political priorities. The continuation of hostilities under the flag of the national liberation war and the leadership of Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the heroic deed of the Muslim Turks, as well as the timely serious military and financial assistance of Soviet Russia made it possible to reverse the course of the war in Turkey.

5. The geopolitical interests of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the Soviet government coincided in this historical period of time. The Moscow and Kars agreements allowed us to introduce a certain order in internal affairs to each state separately.

6. Denunciation of the Moscow and Kars agreements de jure (March 19, 1945) unilaterally by the USSR (Russian Federation, Georgia and Armenia) on the initiative of I.V. Stalin led to destabilization of relations between these states and Turkey. Turkey became a member of NATO. Preservation of the status quo of articles of the Moscow and Kars agreements is a guarantee of a stable peace in this region.
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